Strategic overcapacity in live-streaming platform selling

发布时间:2020-12-16发布部门:旭日工商管理学院

主题:   Strategic overcapacity in live-streaming platform selling主讲人:   张建雄地点:   延安路校区旭日楼306教室时间:   2020-12-22 09:30:00组织单位:   管理学院

报告人简介:张建雄,天津大学管理与经济学部系统工程研究所教授、博士生导师。主要研究方向为企业运营管理、复杂系统建模与决策。入选2019中国高被引学者(决策科学领域)。已在EJOR, JOTA, Omega, IEEE Transactions.及Neural Computation, Pattern Recognition, Biological Cybernetics等国际知名杂志上发表论文100余篇。谷歌学术显示,其论文总被引近1800次,H指数为23。现主持国家自然科学基金面上项目1项,主持完成国家自然科学基金项目2项、教育部博士学科点新教师基金和教育部人文社会科学基金各1项。参与完成教育部“长江学者和创新团队发展计划”项目和国家自然科学基金项目各1项。2011年获得“教育部新世纪优秀人才”称号。2012年获得天津大学“北洋青年学者”称号。协助指导的博士生郑鹏升获得2012年全国百篇优秀博士论文提名奖。获得2014年教育部自然科学奖二等奖(排名第四)。任美国《数学评论》(Mathematical Reviews)评论员。担任Emerald国际杂志Journal of Modelling in Management的Associate Editor。

报告简介:We study the capacity investment strategy of a manufacturer who sells his product on a live-streaming shopping platform. The manufacturer first decides the production capacity, then the platform decides her commission, and finally the manufacturer sets the retail price. The platform has an informational advantage about the product demand due to proximity to the market and accessibility to the sales data of similar products. The manufacturer without a direct access to the demand information tries to infer it from the commission decision of the platform, which results in a signaling game. Interestingly, the manufacturer may strategically install a strictly higher capacity than any demand to be realized. The overcapacity also benefits the manufacturer by driving down the commission charged by the platform when observing a small market potential due to the signaling effect.

视频:   摄影: 撰写:周静  信息员:周莉莉  编辑:孙庆华

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