Information Acquisition, Sharing Incentives, and Channel Selection

发布时间:2020-12-18发布部门:旭日工商管理学院

主题:   Information Acquisition, Sharing Incentives, and Channel Selection主讲人:   李果地点:   延安路校区旭日楼306教室时间:   2020-12-21 10:00:00组织单位:   管理学院

报告人简介:李果,北京理工大学管理与经济学院教授,博士生导师,技术经济与战略管理系主任,长期从事绿色供应链与物流管理、市场营销与运营交叉学科、大数据驱动的决策管理等领域的教学研究工作,担任中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会智能决策与博弈分会常务理事、工业工程分会理事和中国自动化学会经济与管理系统专业委员会委员,中国物流学会理事,International Journal of Advanced Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing副主编,国际知名期刊Information Technology & People (SSCI, ABS-3)高级编辑,UTD24/FT50顶级期刊Production and Operations Management编委,中国工程院院刊Frontier of Engineering Management特约通讯专家,《计算机集成制造系统》(CIMS)期刊理事,国际知名期刊TRE、ANOR、IJPR和IJLRA客座编辑,长期担任POM、DSJ、IISE Transactions、EJOR等30余个SCI/SSCI刊源审稿人,以第一作者或通讯作者在专业领域内顶级/重要期刊JOM (UTD24/FT50)、DSJ、NRL、EJOR、IEEE TEM、IEEE TII、中国管理科学和管理工程学报等上发表论文60余篇。获Structural Change and Economic Dynamics期刊2018年(首届)最佳论文奖,第十九次中国物流学术年会优秀论文奖一等奖等。

报告简介:In this talk, we investigate a manufacturer's information acquisition and subsidization strategies in a supply chain featuring two competing retailers who sell substitutable products and have private demand information. The manufacturer can decide whether to acquire demand information at a cost and further decide whether to offer subsidies simultaneously to retailers to induce their sharing of private demand information. Furthermore, we examine an online retailer’s incentive for demand information sharing with an upstream supplier who has already built a retail channel but possesses an incentive to establish a commission channel. We derive some interesting managerial insights and implications for both academia and practice.

视频:   摄影: 撰写:周静  信息员:周莉莉  编辑:孙庆华

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