主讲人简介：

Ting Zhang，布里斯托大学商学院运营分析方向的高级讲师，2017年获中国科学技术大学与香港城市大学的博士学位。现为《IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management》部门主编，《Transportation Research Part E》编委会成员。其研究聚焦于市场营销与运营管理的交叉领域，研究成果发表于《Production and Operations Management》《European Journal of Operational Research》《Naval Research Logistics》《Decision Sciences》等期刊。

主讲内容简介:

In the gig economy, delivery drivers (e.g., food delivery couriers) face speed-related traffic accidents when serving consumers via delivery platforms (e.g., DoorDash). Injury insurance helps cover drivers’ losses from such accidents, whereas the responsibility for paying insurance premiums may fall on the platform (which connects consumers and drivers) or the drivers themselves. To study the effects of injury insurance and different premium-payment strategies, we analyze three scenarios: no insurance, the platform paying the insurance premium, and drivers paying it. Our findings reveal that the availability of insurance can increase the platform’s profit and the average traffic accident rate among drivers who participate in providing delivery services. Moreover, the platform’s profit and the participating drivers’ average accident rate will be higher when the platform pays the premium than when the drivers pay it. Among the three scenarios, the platform paying the premium will lead to the highest profit for it if the loss in a traffic accident and the consumer’s sensitivity to the delivery time are high, and drivers paying the premium will lead to the lowest average traffic accident rate if the loss in an accident is low. The availability of insurance reduces the total accident costs but harms driver welfare. By highlighting the trade-offs associated with different insurance scenarios, our study provides insights into balancing economic benefits and social costs in the gig economy.