个人简介：

郑捷，山东大学经济研究院教授、博士生导师，山东大学理论与实验经济学研究中心（CREATE）主任。清华大学经济学学士、硕士，美国华盛顿大学经济学硕士、博士。国际学术期刊Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization大陆首位副主编，担任多份SSCI/SCI期刊客座主编。研究领域包括信息经济学、实验经济学、行为经济学、产业经济学，主持过多项国家自然科学基金项目（结题连续获“特优”评价），并多次在学术会议上做主旨演讲与专题报告。已有研究成果发表于《经济研究》、Games and Economic Behavior、Management Science、Nature Communications等国内外经济学、管理学、自然科学各领域的知名期刊。

摘要：

We study the dissolution of joint ownership when n partners have symmetric and independent private values over an indivisible asset and coalitions retain ownership-based outside options. A mechanism is ex post core-selecting if, for every value profile, no coalition receives less than the value it can obtain by retaining its aggregate initial share and assigning that share to its highest value member. For an equal-share partnership, we construct a Bayesian incentive compatible, budget balanced, and ex post core-selecting mechanism. Our construction treats state-contingent slack inside the ex post core as a resource for supplying the marginal incentive deficits. For arbitrary ownership shares, we provide a general construction and characterize feasible ownership shares that admits a core-selecting mechanism. Our approach uses a quantile-by-quantile envelope analysis which allows to reduce the implementation problem into a network flow problem. The resulting feasible ownership region is convex, symmetric, and distribution free: although the payments depend on the value distributions, feasibility depends only on ownership. Finally, we show that both a natural winner-bid auction and the general payment construction of Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer fail ex post core selection.