报告简介：A company’s sales force may includeemployees and/or independent sales representatives (ISRs). Managing ISRs posesgreater challenges than employees: Companies often have limited control andlack insights into ISRs’ preferences and capabilities. Moreover, ISRsself-select companies to work with. The asymmetric information and theindependence between the two parties create an unequal and unobservedrelationship, forcing companies to rely heavily, if not solely, on salesoutcomes when segmenting and targeting ISRs. This study employs a bivariateTobit Hidden Markov model to capture the relationship dynamics betweencompanies and their ISRs. Using data from interactions between an insurancecompany and its independent financial advisors (one type of ISRs), we identifythree relationship states between the parties: low, medium, and high. ISRs indifferent states are motivated at varying levels to work for the company. Thecompany’s marketing efforts, including sales calls and face-to-face meetings,elevate ISRs to a higher state. However, marketing directed at one ISRnegatively affects the relationship between their colleagues and the company -a spillover harming the company’s relationship with other ISRs. Using parameterestimates, we calculate the policy function for companies’ marketing resourceallocation, assisting managers with distributing resources among ISRs andmanaging sales force investments.

报告人简介：郑华璐，美国康涅狄格大学资源经济学博士，美国萨斯克汉纳大学 Sigmund Weis 商学院市场营销系助理教授。主要研究方向包括食品营销、营销伦理与政策、消费者福祉、社交媒体以及人工智能营销等。在Journal of Public Policy and Marketing, Journal of Interactive Marketing,和European Journal of Marketing等期刊发表多篇学术论文。